Writing Armageddon

Writing Armageddon
Furious writing or writing furiously?

Sunday, June 4, 2017

Our Kaiser Trump? The parallels between two foreign policy styles

Our Kaiser Trump? The parallels between two foreign policy styles
by Konstantinos Travlos

Lots of work and research commitments have kept away from this blog. But the time is ripe to make a small contribution. The more I watch the system of foreign policy by Donald Trump, the more I see some equivalencies with the style of foreign policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany. I am not the first to find such similarities (see the following which almost rise to the level of cottage industry:Stop comparing Donald Trump to Hitler – he has more in common with another erratic German leader ; The Emperor vs the Adults: Donald Trump and Wilhelm II ,Germany used to have a leader like Trump. It’s not who you think ; ISSF Policy Series: Is Donald Trump Jimmy Carter, or is he Kaiser Wilhelm II? by Nancy Mitchell ;  Trump’s not the new Hitler... he’s the new Kaiser Bill. by Andrew J. Bacevich, and even CATO waded in with What Trump Has in Common with the Last German Emperor . For a dissenting view see Donald Trump Is No Kaiser Wilhelm ), but I wanted to also give my own view and tie it to the findings of peace science (Since most of the above tend to be done by scholars working in more classical paradigms).

President Trump

Friday, April 28, 2017

Active Learning Component using Bloody Big Battles

This semester I am teaching IR 311: War beyond Europe. The course has two goals

1) to familiarize students with 4 key wars that took place in parts of he world outside Europe. These were the War of the Triple Alliance and the War of the Pacific in Latin America, the 1st Sino-Japanese War, and the Eritrean-Ethiopian War.

2) it is a writing intensive course with the goal of imparting to the students the basics of good academic writing (largely based on what I learned in the Little Red Schoolhouse in the University of Chicago).

As part of the course, and in service of goal (1), I had the students participate in one of two active learning components. These were representations of key battles in the War of the Triple Alliance, and the War of the Pacific, Tuyuti and Tacna respectively. I used the rules system Bloody Big Battles, which has been used in other institutions of learning for pedagogical purposes. The system is for historical battles with miniatures (though one can use counters and 2d maps), in the vein of H.G. Wells "Little Wars", though much more sophisticated.

The Tuyuti Scenario Group

Friday, April 21, 2017

21 Απριλίου 1967/21st April 1967

Η δικτατορία της 21ς Απριλίου είναι ίσως το χειρότερο πράγμα που συνέβη στην Ελλάδα μετά τον εμφύλιο, και όχι μόνο λόγω των βασανιστηρίων και του Κυπριακού. Δεν θέλω να είμαι ουτοπικός αλλά πιστεύω ακράδαντα ότι αν ο Γεώργιος Παπανδρέου, ο Πρεσβύτερος, είχε αφεθεί να κυβερνήσει την Ελλάδα για δυο τετραετίες η χώρα σήμερα θα βρίσκονταν σε καλύτερη θέση. Ότι έκανε ο Ανδρέας με απότομο και εν τέλει καταστροφικό τρόπο, την ενσωμάτωση των «χαμένων» και «αποκλεισμένων» της νόθας δημοκρατίας, θα είχε γίνει με πιο εξελικτικό τρόπο. Ο καταστροφικός λαικισμος του 80 δεν θα είχε συμβεί με την ένταση που συνέβη. Οι θεσμοί της δημοκρατίας θα είχαν ενδυναμωθεί. Το παλάτι μπορεί και μπορεί να μην το είχαμε. Αδιάφορο, καθότι ο Έλληνας βασιλιάς θα ήταν ακόμα λιγότερο θεσμικό πρόσωπο από τον Σουηδό. Το πιο σημαντικό είναι ότι δεν νομίζω ότι θα είχε ακολουθήσει η αλόγιστη σπάταλη τον περιόδων 80-90-2000. Αναγκαία και κατανοητή λόγω των σαθρών καθεστώτων του 40-50-60-70, αλλά καταστροφική. Και το Κυπριακό ναι μεν θα το είχαμε θέμα, αλλά με τελείως άλλη μορφή, και χωρίς το καταστροφικό μέγεθος της προσφυγιάς. Όλα αυτά είναι πιθανά. Ίσως να μην συνέβαινε έτσι. 

Γεωργίος Παπανδρέου-Georgıos Papandreou

Αλλά την πιθανότητα αυτή μας την στέρησε ένας φαύλος βασιλιάς, μια προδοτική Δεξιά, και η ανοησία μελών της CIA. Και ακόμα τα πληρώνουμε.

A dark anniversary for Greece. In a climate of political crisis created by the refusal of the monarchy, elements of the capitalist class, and parties of the Right to accept the possibility of a Left-Liberal government under Georgios Papanderou (the Elder) which might had led to the gradual re-rehabilitation of the millions that had been excluded from the political and paternalistic economic system after the Civil War, elements within the US government and CIA and the Greek military prepared a coup d'etat by the top brass.

Friday, April 7, 2017

Why counterfactuals driven only by ideology are bad. A reaction to Micael Kazin’s “Should America Have Entered World War I?”

Why counterfactuals driven only by ideology are bad. A reaction to Micael Kazin’s “Should America Have Entered World War I?”
by Konstantinos Travlos 

Counterfactuals have a proud tradition both in popular history and in the use of social science (see JamesFearon “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science”). They can help as tease out causal mechanisms and find key decisions in decision tracing. And for many they are a kind of wish-fulfillment.  We cannot change the past, but we can always try to envision how the past would be different. This second type is the one that drives a lot of the alternative history literature.

There is a danger though in that last form of counterfactual. If it is driven by nothing more than wish-fulfillment, then rather than interrogating the historical process that writer will shoe-horn it into their favorite narrative to prove their point. They will in another name choose the interpretation that supports their prejudice. In more social scientific terms, they will choose on the dependent variable. This is exactly what Michael Kazin, historian at Georgetown and editor of the radical progressive magazine Dissent does  in his New York Times opinion piece “ShouldAmerica Have Entered World War I”.

In a quick summary, he argues that the entrance of the US into World War I led to the German decision to lunch Operation Kaiserschlacht (the Spring Offensive in 1918) whose failure led to the decision of Ludendorff and Hindenburg to give up the war. If the US had not entered the war he argues that the war would had lasted one to two more years, a negotiated settlement would had followed forced by the publics, and the political powers that rose from Versailles to feed World War Two would never had risen. This counter-argument is wrong. 

Woodrow Wilson: Racist, Progressive, Political Scientist, US President, War Victor. But also the man at fault for World War 2?

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

Reactions to Peter McPhee “Liberty or Death: The French Revolution”

As always, I must note that hear I am writing not ex-cathedra. That means not on my topic of study and specialty. Thus all of the following is opinion.

My friend Emir gifted me this new book that came out on the French Revolution. McPhee is a well-known scholar of revolutionary France, mostly known for his work on Robespierre . In this monumental book he essentially provides a new grand narrative of the French Revolution in the 1789-1799 period.

Saturday, March 11, 2017

Student Risk of War Analysis:Turkey-Iran

As part of my IR 315: Peace and Conflict Course I had students conduct a Risk of War analysis of a dangerous dyad according to the Simple Risk Barometer developed in Steps to War by Paul Senese and John A. Vasquez. In this series I will upload to the blog the ones I felt were the best. The goal is to show that with some training anyone can use Steps to War to get a handle on current events and the likelihood of war. 

Emre Kocmar 

Contemporary paper with risks of war:
Even though it has soured on certain occasions since the Arab Spring, Iran and Turkey seems to enjoy generally peaceful relationship. Although lacking a common ideology regarding the region both nations reside in an idea of war between Turkey and Iran seems rather unlikely. Therefore i will use Paul Senese and John A. Vasquez’s framework of Steps to War in order to show
why Iranian-Turkish Dyad is a relatively peaceful one.

Saturday, February 11, 2017

The Trump administration and Intestate Managerial Coordination among the major powers

The Trump administration and Intestate Managerial Coordination among the major powers

By Konstantinos Travlos

Abstract "The Trump Presidency may see further degeneration of the weakened managerial coordination among major powers." 

My main subject of research is the causes and consequences of state participation in managerial coordination regimes. In my dissertation and my most recent published work, I explored interstate managerial coordination among the major powers. Using the scale of interstate managerial coordination (IMaC) I tracked the quality of IMaC among major powers over the 1715-2010 period.  Managerial coordination is an important factor in international politics partly because it gives us snapshot of relations between the states participating in it, and partly because low coordination likely fosters militarized conflict in international politics, while high coordination likely dampens it.

These relationships are probabilistic, not deterministic (in another name, the presence or absence of managerial coordination is not always going to lead to the presence or absence of military conflict), thus it would be wrong to assume that low coordination will lead to major power conflict. However, my studies have found that the fostering and inhibiting influence does have empirical traction (reality does on average behave as expected to behave).

One of the main conditions that is associated with lower managerial coordination is what Peter Wallensteen calls “particularism”. “Particularism” is when major powers pursue their interests in total indifference to the interests of other states, or of the robustness of the regimes of the international system. On the other hand, when the major powers are “universalist” they tend to pursue their interests in ways that maximize the possible support by other states and with due consideration to the regimes that make up the international system.

Figure 1