The Trump administration and Intestate Managerial Coordination among the major powers
By Konstantinos Travlos
Abstract "The Trump Presidency may see further degeneration of the weakened managerial coordination among major powers."
My main subject of research is the causes and consequences of state participation in managerial coordination regimes. In my dissertation and my most recent published work, I explored interstate managerial coordination among the major powers. Using the scale of interstate managerial coordination (IMaC) I tracked the quality of IMaC among major powers over the 1715-2010 period. Managerial coordination is an important factor in international politics partly because it gives us snapshot of relations between the states participating in it, and partly because low coordination likely fosters militarized conflict in international politics, while high coordination likely dampens it.
These relationships are probabilistic, not deterministic (in another name, the presence or absence of managerial coordination is not always going to lead to the presence or absence of military conflict), thus it would be wrong to assume that low coordination will lead to major power conflict. However, my studies have found that the fostering and inhibiting influence does have empirical traction (reality does on average behave as expected to behave).
One of the main conditions that is associated with lower managerial coordination is what Peter Wallensteen calls “particularism”. “Particularism” is when major powers pursue their interests in total indifference to the interests of other states, or of the robustness of the regimes of the international system. On the other hand, when the major powers are “universalist” they tend to pursue their interests in ways that maximize the possible support by other states and with due consideration to the regimes that make up the international system.